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Abstract
Blockchain Sharding is a blockchain performance enhancement approach. By splitting a blockchain into several
parallel-run committees (shards), it helps increase transaction throughput, reduce resources required, and increase
reward expectation for participants. Recently, several flexible sharding methods that can tolerate up to n/2 Byzantine
nodes (n/2 security level) have been proposed. However, these methods suffer from two main drawbacks. First, in
a non-sharding blockchain, nodes can have different weight (power or stake) to create a consensus. So an adversary
needs to control half of the overall weight of the system in order for a piece of faulty information to be accepted
into the blockchain (p/2 security level). In blockchain sharding, all nodes carry the same weight. Thus, it is only
under the assumption that the honest participants are creating as many nodes as they can that a n/2 security level
blockchain sharding reaches the p/2 security level. Secondly, when some nodes leave the system, other nodes need
to be reassigned, frequently, from shard to shard in order to maintain the security level of the system. In this paper,
we present Multichain MWPoW, a p/2 security level blockchain sharding architecture that does not require honest
participants to create multiple nodes and requires less node reassignment when some nodes leave the system. It
combines the Multiple Winners Proof of Work consensus protocol (MWPoW) with the flexibility of n/2 blockchain
sharding. Our experiments show that Multichain MWPoW outperforms existing blockchain sharding approaches in
terms of security, transaction throughput and flexibility.
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1. Introduction
Different kinds of blockchain, e.g., Nakamoto Blockchain [1], Ethereum[2], have been proposed in the past ten
years. While blockchains have been designed initially to handle cryptocurrencies, they have since shown promise
for more sophisticated usage, such as powering Decentralised-Autonomous-Organisations (DAO) or Decentralised-
Autonomous-Companies (DAC), where anonymous participants can carry out tasks together without centralised con-
trol. Various mechanisms have been proposed to ensure the integrity of such decentralised work as well as the in-
centives to the participants, blockchains still suffer from both security and performance problems which significantly
limit their applicability in practice.
The fairness and decentralisation of blockchain-based systems are dependent on how participants reach public
consensus. This is usually done by a strength competition known as mining. Participants synchronise the new transac-
tions, verify and approve the first legit block that reaches the threshold strength in every time window. If they approve
a block, they will compete to create a new block of the threshold strength on top of the block (the hash of the block
is embedded to the text of the new block). Rewards are then given to the creator of the approved block as incentive.
This procedure, however, overlooks the heterogeneous nature of devices used in a blockchain, causing a vicious circle
between the reward rate deprivation and the arms race for stronger computation capability as well as broader net-
work bandwidth. This vicious circle can ultimately result in a centralised system where some participants are always
winners of competitions, while others leave the system. Besides, as blockchains seek to improve throughput, they
may choose extending block size or employing mining pools. Extending block size may force less powerful devices
to leave the system as they do not have the capacity needed to constantly download and verify large blocks from the
network. This drives a blockchain system gradually towards a centralised one. A mining pool assembles less powerful
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participants and uses them collectively to create blocks. But as participants in a mining pool do not know how their
computation power is used, this raises concerns over system security.
Various approaches have been explored to solve the security and performance problems associated with blockchains.
These approaches can be commonly categorised into off-chains [3, 4], lightweight blocks [5, 6, 7], weighted models
[8, 9, 10], directed acyclic graphs [11, 12], and blockchain sharding [13, 14, 15, 16]. Among these, blockchain shard-
ing is promising as it offers a good balance between security and performance. Blockchain sharding works by splitting
a blockchain into several parallel-run committees (shards), thereby increasing transaction throughput, reducing com-
putational capacity required, increasing reward expectation for participants, yet still maintaining the security level
required. Recently, several flexible sharding methods that can tolerate up to n/2 Byzantine nodes (n/2 security level)
have been proposed. However, these methods suffer from two main drawbacks. First, in a non-sharding blockchain,
nodes can have different weight (power or stake) to create a consensus. So an adversary needs to control half of
the overall weight of the system in order for a piece of faulty information to be accepted into the blockchain (p/2
security level). In blockchain sharding, all nodes carry the same weight. Thus, it is only under the assumption that the
honest participants are creating as many nodes as they can that a n/2 security level blockchain sharding reaches the
p/2 security level. Secondly, when some nodes leave the system, other nodes need to be reassigned, frequently, from
shard to shard in order to maintain the security level of the system.
In this paper, we propose Multichain MWPoW, a p/2 security level blockchain sharding architecture that does
not require honest participants to create multiple nodes and requires less node reassignment when some nodes leave
the system. It combines the Multiple Winners Proof of Work consensus protocol (MWPoW) with the flexibility of
n/2 blockchain sharding. Our experiments show that Multichain MWPoW outperforms existing blockchain sharding
approaches in terms of security, transaction throughput and flexibility. In the rest of the paper, we first provide a brief
review of some of the well-known non-sharding blockchain approaches in Section 2 to give some background to our
work, and then describe the blockchain sharding idea in detail in Section 3 and 4. We will describe our Multichain
MWPoW approach in detail in Section 6, and highlight the challenges associated with it in Section 7. Analysis of the
Multichain MWPoW structure in terms of bandwidth demand is given in Section 8. We report our performance study
in Section 9. Finally we draw conclusions in Section 10.
2. Non-Sharding Blockchain Approaches
Blockchains were initially proposed to deal with cryptocurrency transactions. Central to this technique is a Proof
of Work (PoW) scheme which describes a system that is difficult to create but easy to verify. The most widely
used PoW scheme, Hashcash [17], is based on SHA-256 and is part of Bitcoin (Nakamoto blockchain) used as a
computation strength competition method. Since then different kinds of PoW alternatives have been proposed for
blockchains [18, 19, 20].
A block in a blockchain embeds the information of a specific period, and the blockchain is periodically updated by
the participants competing to create new blocks and attaching them to the existing chains of blocks. In a blockchain,
Difficulty is a measure of how difficult it is to generate a PoW:
Difficulty =
difficulty target
current target
(1)
where difficulty target is a 256-bit constant and current target is any 256-bit number. When calculating the difficulty
of a hash, the hash is used as the current target. A blockchain network has a global block difficulty: valid blocks
must have a hash below the current target, and the hash is adjusted by changing the value of Nonce (a field in the
block). The global difficulty is adjusted to limit the rate at which the network can generate a new block within an
approximately fixed time interval. A blockchain also has a pre-set security requirement that honest people must take
more than 50% of the total calculation power so that malicious participants cannot to create a longer fork branch
of blocks when honest people are working on another. New participants can then determine the correct records by
staying with the longest chain (or the mainchain), which is expected to be longer than the second-longest chain by at
least some given length.
When powering a cryptocurrency using a blockchain, the participants only need to check whether the sender of
a transaction has spent the fund or not in the blocks of the blockchain before they accept this transaction. As a
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result, double-spending is prevented: no one should be able to send the same money to more than one receiver at the
same time. However, when we use blockchains to power other decentralised applications, additional performance and
security issues have been considered and various approaches have been proposed to address them.
2.1. Off-chain approach
“If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?” The quote questions the relevance
of unobserved events – if nobody hears the tree fell, whether it has made a sound or not is of no consequence [3]. In
a blockchain, if only two participants care about an everyday recurring transaction, it is not necessary for all other
participants in the blockchain network to know about that transaction [3].
The Off-chain approach was created based on this philosophy. Nodes use Micropayment channels [21, 22] to es-
tablish a relationship between two parties to perpetually update balances, deferring what is broadcast to the blockchain
in a single transaction, netting out the total balance between the two parties [21]. The Off-chain approach empowers
nodes to transfer funding privately through micropayment channels, and has mechanisms to secure the interest of the
other side of the channel if a node makes a violation of its previous off-chain statements [4].
The Off-chain approach is quick and efficient. However, if we view it from a financial perspective: a network of
Bidirectional Payment Channels [23] (similar to a BGP system) would be needed when multi-parties are involved.
Consequently, users with a large sum of money become banks, and the system is then tending to be financially cen-
tralised. Note that with the Off-chain, transactions are only broadcast when one party violates previous transactions.
If we assume that such transaction broadcasting is not often needed, users must keep monitoring the blockchain and
refund their funding when violations are made [3]. This prevents personal devices like mobile phones and desktops
from using the off-chain blockchains directly because they might not be able to monitor a blockchain all day long.
Also, it is not clear how to use the off-chain approach in non-financial applications.
2.2. Lightweight block approach
Because transactions are broadcast to a network, it is relatively safe to assume that nodes would have received
the majority of the transactions before receiving a block. The transactions inside a lightweight block are replaced
using tiny transaction hashes, and the relevant plain-text transactions are only shared when a node fails to decode a
lightweight node. Graphene [5] is a blockchain protocol that makes a block contain over 2000 transactions with a size
of only 2.1 Kbytes. Similar approaches are Xtreme Thinblocks [6] and Compact Blocks [7]. The lightweight block
approach significantly extends block throughput. However, nodes with less computational power might not be able
to hear the extensive information due to limited bandwidth or to verify the information and calculate PoW in time to
catch up with the mainchain. Thus, it may cause a more severe arms race among nodes.
2.3. Weighted models
With blockchains based on weighted models, some criteria are used to weight nodes in a blockchain such that the
duties of the nodes are differentiated by their weights. A lightweight node system is an example of the weighted model:
a lightweight node does not store any block and is a client of full nodes. Full nodes are the nodes that synchronise
all transactions and blocks. Lightweight nodes use Simple Payment Verification (SPV) inquires to request relevant
previous transactions from the full nodes to verify a new transaction. A lightweight node only takes up to 4.2 MBytes
per year, regardless of the total size of blockchain [8], but it cannot verify the next blocks and can be misled by the
full nodes. Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [9] is a model where people elect a fixed number of representatives and
contribute their stakes to these representatives. These representatives then compete in the game of PoS [18]. DPoS can
support massive throughput because the representative nodes usually have a superpower calculation ability, storage,
and network bandwidth.
These models are now commonly used in many blockchain-powered IoT systems, where lightweight nodes are
at the edge, and they contribute their stakes to DPoS to function the system. These models are using authoritar-
ian/superior nodes, and they are potentially centralised. The system security depends on these representatives. There-
fore, weighted models are not an appropriate approach for DAO and DAC, which is what blockchains originally
proposed and designed to support.
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2.4. Directed acyclic graph
IOTA[24] is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) implementing a blockchain, and it eliminates the power centralisa-
tion problem caused by extensive PoW competition. It is not like an ordinary blockchain: it does not employ a mining
mechanism, nor holds periodical competitions. Instead, all actions in IOTA are carried out asynchronously. However,
IOTA is more vulnerable to the so-called 34% power attack [12], and still requires a rather long pending time to use a
transaction as an INPUT from the new transactions. In addition, nodes are still required to download a great number
of transactions to determine the reliability of subsequent transactions.
3. Blockchain sharding
Blockchain sharding is a blockchain performance enhancement approach that divides transactions and participants
of a blockchain into multiple zones (referred to as shards). This increases blockchain throughput as participants and
shards increase. Every transaction has a corresponding shard that deals with any future transactions based on it.
By enabling multiple shards to process transactions in parallel, the throughput is increased without increasing the
computational requirement of the nodes. Blockchain sharding has also been used to reduce storage requirement for
nodes [25], which helps blockchains to be implemented on IoT devices that lack storage space. Financial models [26]
can be built into blockchain sharding to link the digital labour and market behaviour to the changes in pay and service
prices.
However, the first sharding consensus protocol Elastico [13] has four weaknesses. First, after every iteration, all
shards need to be rebuilt, and node identities need to be reset. Second, because it demands a significant amount of
time to fill up all the shards by solving enough PoWs, the latency grows linearly with the increase of network size.
Third, an adversary may calculate PoW in advance so that he or she can mislead the process of assigning nodes to
shards. Fourth, as a shard of small size (around 100 members) is needed to restrict the running of Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [27] in each shard, it increases failure probability. This implies that the protocol is insecure in
practice because the failure probability can be over 0.97 after six iterations [14]. Furthermore, even though Elastico
requires each participant only to verify a subset of transactions, they must still synchronise every block from every
shard.
Some improvements have been suggested to overcome these weaknesses. RSCoin [15] is a sharding protocol
designed to scale up centrally-banked cryptocurrencies. It is an approach that attempts to transparentise today’s
banking systems by combining a distributed network with a centralised monetary supply. However, this blockchain
protocol relies on a trusted source and it is not Byzantine fault-tolerant because each shard is executed on a two-phase
commit protocol. OmniLedger [14] solved the problems suffered by the Elastico protocal, but it can only tolerate up
to n/4 adversary nodes where n is the total number of nodes in a blockchain. RapidChain [16] increased this tolerance
to n/3, but every shard must use a fixed size instead of a Binominal (or approximately, Poisson) random variable. As
such, the shard size can still be a significant issue that will limit the improvement on blockchain throughput.
Xu and Huang [28] have recently proposed a new approach that takes blockchain sharding to a n/2 security level
or can tolerate up to n/2 adversary nodes. This approach classifies nodes into different classes and maintains an equal
number of nodes of different classes in every shard. This approach does not only increase security level, but also
substantially shrinks shard size. However, such a blockchain can grind to a halt by an adversary with less than n/2
of nodes, that is, the blockchain stops to generate new blocks but the record in the blockchain is still correct. There
is an extension to this approach [29], which dynamically alters the number of classes as well as the size of shards to
bound the probability of global halting by an adversary and recovers the system from halting eventually. However,
the number of shards allowed in this extension can be reduced drastically, which can un-stabilise throughput. Also
for both solutions, every time new nodes are added or existing nodes leave the blockchain, a global node membership
adjustment will take place. These drawbacks increase the frequency in data synchronisation, and uncertainty in system
stability and throughput.
In the rest of this section, we explain the concept of blockchain sharding and the security models associated with
a number of existing blockchain sharding approaches in detail.
3.1. Blockchain sharding hypothesis
Following the Off-chain philosophy, it is not necessary for everyone to hear every tree falling to maintain the
fairness of a system. The fact that a tree has fallen and the correct time of its fall has been recognised by most people
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around the tree assumes that these people have not colluded. Collusion is hard to take place when a sufficient number
of people are assigned randomly to and evenly distributed in sub-areas of the forest, and if we relocate people from
time to time to prevent accumulation of potential collusion in any particular sub-area. Blockchain sharding follows
from this hypothesis. As long as the random and distributed assignment of nodes is secure and follows the principle
of proportionality, taking control of a sub-area (shard) would require a similar effort as taking control of the whole
forest (the system). Figure 1 shows an illustration of this hypothesis.
Forest Forest
Traditional blockchain
(oversee the whole forest) (oversee a sub-area)
Blockchain sharding
x x
Figure 1: The philosophy of blockchain sharding
Note that this proposal is secure only when (1) people assigned to a sub-area of the forest have the right to record
information about this sub-area; (2) no one cannot control or predict the sub-area into which it will be assigned; (3)
the assignment follows a globally recognised rule, not by the power of some specific group of superior people; (4)
people are periodically reassigned; and (5) qualified people can be assigned and the qualification period is not shorter
than the time that one can continuously stay in a sub-area. This means that there will be no benefit for anyone to quit a
sub-area and start over again, in case the miner assigned to a shard does not want to stay anymore. When the security
threshold is maintained for the whole blockchain, we have more than half of the total population (or half of the total
calculation power) being honest people. They do not need to hear every falling tree by themselves. They would only
need to check the falling time of a tree in the sub-area that is of interest to them. If every sub-area does this, then
people do not need to have a super hearing power, especially when the forest is dense. Instead, they only need to focus
on monitoring the sub-area they are assigned to and split/merge sub-areas when they become dense or sparse.
3.2. Security models and levels
While blockchain sharding is a simple and appealing concept, there are some substantial security challenges to be
addressed. First, how do we distribute people to sub-areas in a decentralised and unpredictable way? Second, how can
people determine if a record of a sub-area is made by people assigned to that area? Third, without monitoring what
happens in a sub-area, how can an outsider know if the majority in that sub-area supports a record or not? Fourth, to
make a collusion hard to happen, how large the population in a sub-area must be and how many sub-areas the forest
must have? In this section we discuss the security models and issues surrounding the blockchain sharding approach.
Failure probability
Assuming that there exists some method that can solve all or some of the challenges, we would like to know how
likely its node assignment would cause a collusion to happen in a shard, or its failure probability. Given n nodes, the
probability of having no less than X(X > m/2) adversary nodes in a shard when randomly picking a shard of size
m (the number of nodes inside the shard) can be calculated by the cumulative hypergeometric distribution function
without replacement. Let X denote the random variable corresponding to the number of adversary nodes in a shard.
The failure probability for one shard is
Pr[X > bm/2c] =
m∑
X=bm/2c+1
(
t
X
)(
n−t
m−X
)(
n
m
) (2)
where t is the number of adversary nodes in the system. Figure 2 shows the maximum probability to fail with
n = 2000, t = n/3, t = n/2 and m = n/s where s is the number of shards. As can be seen from the result, the system
has a very high failure chance when the adversary takes n/2 of nodes. This is the main reason why most blockchain
sharding approaches can only withstand up to n/3 of nodes being adversary and only a few shards can exist.
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Figure 2: The chance to fail when n = 2000 and m = n/s where s is the number of shards;
n/2 security level blockchain sharding
In this section, we introduce a sharding approach that can withstand n/2 of nodes being adversary in a system of n
nodes. Let there be m classes of nodes and s number of shards. Every shard must have one and only one node of each
class, so every shard has m nodes from the m classes. A consensus of a statement in a shard is reached when at least a
pre-defined T number of nodes in this shard agree on this statement, typically T > m/2. The system is separated into a
working zone and a pending zone, such that the nodes inside the working zone are placed into the shards and can mine
(verify transactions, propose and approve blocks), while the nodes in the pending zone will wait to be assigned into
the working zone. When new nodes join the system, they choose a class and are placed into the pending zone. Every
class of nodes in the pending zone forms a queue and the nodes are queued in order of time at which they choose a
class. Let wq(i, j) represent node j of class i in the pending zone, and let lwq(i) represent the number of nodes of class
i in the pending zone. Every time when min1≤i≤m lwq(i) ≥ Q where Q is a pre-defined number, then the first Q nodes
of every class are added to the working zone, and all the nodes in the working zone are reassigned to shards.
Now assume that an adversary control Ai nodes in class i in the working zone, and without loss of generality the
adversary puts all the controlled nodes into classes i = 1, . . . ,T of the m classes. Note that as the adversary has no
more than n/2 of nodes, he or she does not have enough nodes to fill up all the spots in T classes. Then, the probability
for the adversary to secure a manipulated consensus inside a shard is
Pr[T ] =
T∏
i=1
Ai
s
(3)
where T is the number of nodes the adversary must take in a shard to manipulate the consensus. Table 1 shows a
possible node assignment schedule table for 10 shards run in parallel with a shard size of 5 (5 people in different
classes), where A refers to an adversary node and H an honest one.
Table 1: Class based node assignment
Class
Shard
0 1 2 3 4
Class 1 A A A A A
Class 2 H A H A H
Class 3 A H A H A
Class 4 H A H H A
Class 5 H H H H A
To derive maximised Pr[T ], we want
∏T
i=1 Ai maximised because s is the same. Let the adversary control a total
of t nodes, then t =
∑m
i=1 Ai. To maximise
∏T
i=1 Ai, we consider
Ai = d(t/T )e, i ∈ [1, t mod T ] (4)
Ai = b(t/T )c, i ∈ (t mod T,T ] (5)
This represents the maximised scenario because given any positive integer Z,
Z × Z > (Z − 1) × (Z + 1) = Z × Z − 1. (6)
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Therefore, the maximum chance for the adversary to succeed on an attack is to place the nodes into T classes as
equally as possible. Thus,
Pr[T ]max ≈ ( tT × s )
T (7)
If T = m (all the people in a shard reach the same decision), then
Pr[T = m]max ≈ ( ts × m )
m (8)
Now if the adversary controls t = s×m2 nodes (half of the overall population), then the failure probability is
Pr[T = m]max ≈ (12 )
m (9)
So to make the system function securely, we want T ≈ [m/2] while meeting the security threshold (e.g. 10−6
failure chance). Figure 3 shows the maximum failure chance with different s,n = s × m = 2000, T = 0.7 × m and
t = 1000 (1/2 fraction of the overall population).
s ∈ [2, 600], t = 1000 = n/2 s ∈ [2, 34], t = 1000 = n/2
Figure 3: The chance to fail with different s when n = 2000 and m = n/s where s is the number of shards;
As can be seen from the result, when there are 10 shards and n/2 people being adversary, the failure chance is
below 10−20, which significantly outperforms the previous sharding approach at 10−6 (see Figure 2) when there are
10 shards and only n/3 nodes being adversary. If we maintain failure chance at 10−6 with T = 0.7 × m, on the other
hand, then the n/2 approach can have 33 shards running in parallel, which is significantly better than the n/3 solution.
Global halting problem
With the n/2 approach introduced above, an adversary will not be able to manipulate a consensus when he or she
does not control at least T nodes inside a shard. However, it can still halt a consensus to be reached on a statement
when it has m − T + 1 nodes in a shard. As a result, the verdict on this statement cannot be made until the nodes are
reassigned. So the whole system can halt when there are s × (m − T + 1) adversary nodes and all of these nodes are
in the same m − T + 1 classes. In this case, it is guaranteed that the adversary will have m − T + 1 nodes inside every
shard. Table 2 shows an example of a system halting. With m = 5 and T = 4, the adversary takes m − T + 1 nodes
in every Shard. Note that the halting problem cannot be eased by adding more nodes, as the shard which in charge of
the membership issues will also stop to function.
Table 2: A halting scenerio
Class
Shard
0 1 2 3 4
Class 1 A A A A A
Class 2 A A A A A
Class 3 H H H H H
Class 4 H H H H H
Class 5 H H H H H
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Flexible n/2 security level blockchain sharding
A flexible n/2 security level blockchain sharding approach [29] has been proposed to solve the problem of global
halting. In this approach, every node is given a colour from the colour spectrum, and every shard categories its nodes
by grouping them to their closest base colours. If there are m categories inside a shard, then there are m base colours,
which together represent the colour spectrum as a whole. Figure 4 shows an example of base colour. The system may
change the number of categories (by combining/splitting shards) to maintain the security threshold. When a global
halting occurs, we can increase the categorisation number globally (which will decrease the number of shards) to
overcome the halting problem. Because the adversary does not have more resources than the honest people globally,
in the worse case, the halting problem can be solved by reducing the number of shards to one. Once a system halting
scenario is resolved, the system can then begin to split shards again.
We now consider the failure probability of this flexible n/2 security level sharding approach. Assume that an
adversary has t = n2 − 1 nodes. The chance for the adversary to take control of a shard in a system of n nodes, m
base colours and s shards (s = n/m) is:
Pr[T ]Max = (
t
T × s )
T
= (
t/T
n/m
)
T
≈ ( m
2 × T )
T
(10)
So when the adversary takes T > 0.5m colour categories of nodes inside a shard, it controls that Shard. Thus, T can
be adjusted with m while maintaining a fixed threshold failure chance. As can be seen from Figure 5, when m is over
800, T/m is very close to 0.5, i.e. the adversary needs to take approximately n/2 of nodes to break the system.
Colour spectrum
Eight base colours
Four base colours
Figure 4: The colours spectrum and base colours
Figure 5: T/m for maintaining a 10−6 failure chance with different m
4. p/2 security level blockchain sharding
Blockchain sharding approaches use plurality voting instead of resource/strength competition (mining) to generate
consensus in every shard. That is, they trust a statement voted by most people, rather than by most strengths/influences,
inside a shard. Thus, while an adversary in classical blockchains needs more than 50% of overall strength to replace
the mainchain with a new chain (referred to as p/2 security level), an adversary in blockchain sharding would need
to take more than n/3 or n/2 of the total number of nodes to force faulty information into a blockchain (referred to as
n/3 or n/2 security level).
An n/3 security level is always less secure than a p/2 level, and an n/2 security level is generally less secure
than a p/2 level. n/2 and p/2 security levels offer equal security only when all participants in an n/2 level sharding
scheme create as many nodes in the system as they can. This is because in an n/2 or n/3 sharding, a node only needs
to have certain (threshold) strength to join the system, yet a participant may have more strength than a node requires,
therefore in order to fully present all their strengths, they need to create multiple nodes within the system. However,
there is a cost for a participant to maintain many nodes, as their nodes can be assigned to different shards, requiring
increased workload in sychronising and processing data. Due to this cost, an honest participant, especially those using
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a device with a limited computational power, is likely to create just one or a small number of nodes, leaving room for
an adversary to create many nodes to gain control over the system,
In this section, we propose a p/2 blockchain sharding approach that (1) requires less frequent data resynchronisa-
tion and membership adjustment in comparison to [28, 29]; (2) overcomes the halting problem [28] before a complete
halting occurs; (3) causes less loss in transaction throughput than [29] when recovering from halting; and (4) lifts an
n/2 Byzantine node resistant blockchain into a p/2 Adversary (Byzantine) power resistant level. In the following we
describe this approach in detail.
4.1. Model description and failure chance analysis
Suppose that every node has a different strength when voting a consensus. In PoW-based systems, this strength
represents the calculation power that a participant has, whereas in PoS-based systems, it represents the amount of stock
that a participant has. In this paper, we refer to strength as calculation power. Our model has three main components.
1. Node classification. Line up all the nodes into a list L = {L0, . . . , Ln} in order of their strengths and n is the
number of nodes in the system (excluding pending nodes). Let CPx represent the strength of Lx and Sg be a
pre-defined number of groups for nodes such that every group i ∈ [0, Sg) has a lower strength boundary bl(i)
than others in the CP list.
bl(i) = CPb nSg×ic, i ∈ [0, Sg) (11)
Every shard must have at least one node from every group.
2. Block evaluation. We assume that when an adversary proposed a block containing faulty information, the
honest nodes would not vote for it. Let AP be the overall strength of the adversary nodes, the chance for a block
in shard j being controlled by the adversary is
Pr( j) =
i<Sg∏
i=0
(
AP/tt
NgS(i, j)
)
(
n/Sg
NgS(i, j)
) (12)
where NgS(i, j) is the number of nodes in group i which are currently located in shard j and have voted for the
block; DG(i) = 1 if at least one node from group i in shard j voted for this block, otherwise DG(i) = 0. Let
tt =
i<Sg∑
i=0
DG(i) × bl(i) (13)
In order to make the system maintain a p/2 security level, we consider
AP =
∑x<n
x=0 CPx
2
(14)
Formula 12 brings an overestimated result because we assume every node in any group i has the same strength
(bl(i)). Figure 6 gives an illustration of Equation 12. We can accept this block safely if (1) more than half of the
strength in shard j has voted for it (the majority principle), and (2) the chance for the block to be a wrong one
is lower than the security threshold. Nodes can still mine on blocks that are insecure, but transactions in them
would only be accepted when the blocks or the branches stemmed from them reached the security threshold.
3. Shard merge. From time to time, some shards may merge. Shard j will be merged with another when:
(a) Max(Pr( j)) > Th, where Th is a security threshold (e,g. 10−6). Max(Pr( j)) = Pr( j), when for every
i ∈ [0, Sg), DG(i) = 1. It is obvious that shard j should be merged with others when all the nodes inside
shard j have voted for a block but the chance for this block to be a wrong one (proposed by the adversary)
is still larger than the security threshold.
(b) When at least five continuous blocks in the mainchain of shard j have not reached the security threshold.
In this case, we say a local halt has occurred.
(c) When there is no node from a group currently located in shard j.
To make a local halt difficult, we want every possible AP/tt to be smaller. Thus, when adding new nodes, the
system should prioritise those shards whose strength is close to the average strength of nodes. They should post
penalty or delay adding nodes that would raise AP/tt. Restrictions should also be placed to avoid an extremely
unbalanced power distribution inside the system.
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Figure 6: An explanation of formula 12. Sg = 4. The heights of the bars represent the strengths of the nodes. If a block has supports from every
group, then tt =
∑3
i=0 bl(i). The adversary would create AP/tt number of nodes in every group – the best strategy for the adversary is to place an
equal number of nodes into different groups for the reason given in Section 3.2.
4.2. Our approach
In our approach, chains are like shards in the previous n/2 approaches but shards can dynamically merge or
split depending on the workload. Nodes are ranked according to their strength, and they are divided into groups, as
introduced in Section 4.1. Restrictions are placed to secure every chain having at least one node from every group,
and there are mechanisms to restore the restrictions when they are broken. More specifically, We require that,
1. Taking any 2/3 fraction of nodes out of the system, the sum of their strength must be equal to or larger than 1/2
fraction of overall strength in the system. Nodes will be kept in the pending status if adding them to the system
would compromise this requirement.
2. Every shard can assign nodes to other shards, there is no particular chains to deal with membership issues (like
the committee shard in [28, 29]).
3. Nodes are only required to synchronise the blocks of the chain they are assigned to and the block headers of all
chains.
4. The nodes are relocated from chain to chain on a periodical basis (e.g. every Ti iterations of the mining game
after the node participated, and Ti is a pre-defined parameter). We do not adjust the nodes globally when adding
new nodes.
5. When new miners are joining in the system, we ask them to present Ti times of strength that they intend to use
per iteration of the mining game. In this way, it requires the same effort between remaining in a chain for Ti
iteration of mining and qualifying as a new miner.
6. A miner does not need to be re-qualified if it is re-assigned to other chains after Ti iterations of competition.
7. In every round of a mining game, the chains exchange their local group boundaries of their nodes. They do so
by recording that information into the block header, which is synchronised by everyone. By viewing all block
headers, bl(i ∈ [0, Sg)) of Formula 11 can be derived.
We use an edited MWPoW [19] (will be discussed in session 5), a decentralised mining pool like blockchain
protocol as the protocol to run every chain. The design of MWPoW that a miner needs to register strength before
participating in the mining game can secure the power distribution in a multichain scenario. It also helps divide nodes
into different groups automatically. By using the edited MWPoW, nodes of other chains can determine if a block of a
chain is created by the population of that chain and if the majority supports that block.
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Figure 7 and Table 3 show a comparison among the IOTA, blockchain, Multichain MWPoW and other blockchain
sharding approaches. Full nodes in the IOTA store every transaction ever sent to the network. Full nodes in the
blockchain store every block in the mainchain. Nodes in other sharding approaches keep transactions in their areas as
well as node membership information from a particular shard (the committee or the court office).
IOTA
Blockchain
Article [28, 29]
Multichain
MWPoW
Figure 7: Local storage comparison
Table 3: Comparison of approaches
Name
Transactions
stored *
Byzantine fault
tolerance level
Storage refreshing
time#
Transaction pending
time (minutes)$
Maximum No.
of shardsˆ
Nakamoto Tx p/2 None 30 (3 block confirmation) 1
Article [28] Tx/s
n/2,
global halt may occur. Tadd + Tdrop 10 (Plurality voting) & 33
Article [29] Tx/s
n/2,
global halt recoverable.
Tadd + Tdrop+
restriction restore 10 (Plurality voting) & 33
IOTA Tx p/2 None Unstable @ None
RapidChain Tx/s n/3 Tadd/Avgadd
Plurality voting
and unstable % 10
Multichain
MWPoW Tx/s
p/2,
no global halt
Every Ti iteration
and restriction restore
Around 12.5
(0.25 block interval)∼ 33
* Tx is the number of overall transactions, and s is the number of shards.
#
Tadd/Tdrop refer to every time when there are nodes added or dropped.
Avgadd refers to the average number of nodes added each time.
$ The block interval is 10 minutes, and the transactions must pend before the block reaches its acceptance criteria.
@
IOTA requires an accumulation of later transactions pointed to a transaction in order to accept that transaction.
Thus, the speed to accept a transaction eventually is largely dependent on how active the network is.
% As it needs approval from all the Input committees, the time to accept a transaction is unstable.
&
Plurality voting systems require nodes to vote within a pre-defined time window (block interval), and the transaction is
confirmed after one block interval if a consensus is reached.
∼
Nodes in Multichain MWPoW need to submit four shares (PoWs) per iteration. Thus, when a node reaches Acceptance
Difficulty, a support rate can be derived similarly to that of Plurality voting. Sometimes the support rate of a block is not
enough to make a block to be accepted eventually, and we need to wait until new blocks to be created on top of it. On
average, a block can be accepted in 1/4 block interval after it has been announced (reaches Acceptance Difficulty).
ˆ
In a 2000-node system and the system is secure from global halting. For Multichain MWPoW, there are 33% of power that
is adversary power. For others, the adversary nodes are taken 33% of the overall node population.
Note that with Rapidchain [16], whenever a fixed number of nodes is added to a shard, the same number of existing
nodes need to be re-assigned to other shards. Nodes then need to synchronise data from the new shard once they are
there. In [28, 29], when nodes are added or dropped, nodes assignment needs to be adjusted to meet the categorisation
requirement. Also, local halting is resolved by a global membership re-arrangement. When global halting occurs,
the approach given in [29] will also need to re-assign nodes while cutting the colour categorisation. In our proposed
approach, the adjustment is more stable. We re-assign nodes to other shards after every Ti iterations of a mining game,
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where Ti is a pre-defined global parameter. A shard would merge with another to overcome local halting, and there is
no need to make global membership adjustment.
To avoid the double-spending problem, in our approach, transactions are governed by different chains: new trans-
actions can only be conducted on the governing chain of the INPUT transaction. If a user wants to transfer a transac-
tion to another chain, they need to conduct a cross-chain operation. Furthermore, our approach does not have levels
of committees, a feature inherited from the fast confirmation property of MWPoW [19], and as such it generally
outperforms other strength-based blockchains in terms of transactions per second.
In summary, our proposed Multichain MWPoW approach has the following novelties:
• Increased Byzantine Resiliency. To the best of our knowledge, Multichain MWPoW is the first sharding
approach that can withstand up to 50% of Adversary (Byzantine) power without assuming honest nodes having
to hold as many nodes as possible. There is less chance for a global halting to occur, as it cannot be deliberately
planned like the scenario we discussed in Section 3.2. If a global halting does happen by accident, it can be
resolved just like how we deal with a local halting.
• More Flexibility. A chain (shard) can be split and merged base on its data flow. Every chain can carry a
different number of participants. In contrast, the number of shards in RapidChain [16] and in [28] are fixed. In
[29], this number can change, but nodes still need to be equally divided into shards. When they lose a node in a
shard, they need to cancel that shard, pushing nodes back to the pending zone and reorganise a new shard from
the pending zone. Our approach is therefore more efficient.
• Increased Transaction per Second. Less time is spent on halting, and an attack is hard to be conducted.
Multichain MWPoW allows fewer number of nodes per chain, and the chains are more stable. More shards can
process transactions in parallel for the same security threshold compared to others.
• Faster Transaction Confirmation. There is no level of election network in Multichain MWPoW. A transaction
is confirmed when the governing chain has confirmed it. There is only one governing chain per transaction.
5. Multiple Winners Proof of Work protocol
Multiple Winners Proof of Work (MWPoW) protocol [19] is proposed to shorten the transaction pending time,
improve the reward rate for individual miners, and ease the centralisation problem of blockchain. In the following we
first introduce some definitions, then describe how the protocol works.
5.1. Definitions
• Calculation Power Claim. A miner’s calculation power is defined as the hash difficulty one can achieve in a
fixed time window, or what a miner intends to reach in every episode of a mining game.
CP = CP0 + CP1 + · · · + CPN−1 (15)
where CP is the overall calculation power claimed by registered participants, N the number of registered par-
ticipants in the network, and CPi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 is the calculation power claim of registered participant i.
• New Join. New Join is a data set which records the calculation power claim of a participant and a wallet address
of this participant (the wallet address is used for receiving remuneration). There is a HashPrevBlock field in the
New Join, which records the hash of the latest block in the mainchain. There is a Nonce field in the New Join,
which is used for adjusting the hash of the New Join. For a New Join to be valid, its hash must meet at least the
calculation power claim indicated in the New Join.
• Try Range. Try range TR is a number interval of Nonce in the block header.
TRi =
 i−1∑
k=0
Ttk,
i∑
k=0
Ttk
 ,Tti∈N = CPiCP ∗ 2256 (16)
where N is the number of registered participants in the network. Miner i ∈ N mines on TRi.
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• Acceptance Difficulty. The first block which reaches Acceptance Difficulty in an episode of mining should be
placed in the mainchain. Acceptance Difficulty is adjusted based on how much time has been consumed for the
winner block to achieve the Acceptance Difficulty.
ADx =
BI ∗ ADx−1
Timestampx−1 − Timestampx−2
(17)
where ADx is the Acceptance Difficulty at block height X; BI is the pre-defined block interval, and Timestampx
is the time when block X is created.
• Entrance Difficulty. A block is broadcast to the network when it reaches Entrance Difficulty. Entrance Diffi-
culty of a new episode is adjusted based on how many blocks reach Entrance Difficulty in the previous round
of the mining game.
EDx = min(
NEx−1
DN
∗ EDx−1, ADx2 ) (18)
where EDx is the Entrance Difficulty at block height X, NEx−1 the number of blocks reach Entrance difficulty
at block height X − 1, and DN the ideal number of NE, which is set 1.
• Share. Share is a container of Nonce when broadcasting. The Nonce inside a Share, sent by a miner, must
make the hash of the block fulfill at least 25% of this miner’s calculation power claim.
• Countable Share. If a miner has sent at least two Shares for a block, the difficulties of these Shares will be
count towards the Support Rate of this block, and the miner will be able to receive remuneration for announcing
this block if this block wins the game later.
• Share Difficulty Cap. The maximum sum of difficulties of Countable Shares sent by a miner X in a round of a
game is CPX (its calculation power claim). If it sends more, the sum is capped at CPX .
• Reward.
Ri∈NR =
SDi
SD{X}
∗ R{X} (19)
NR represents the miners who have contributed Countable Shares for announcing block X; R{X} is the overall
reward assigned from the system for the block in block height X; Shares of block X are embedded in block
X + 1; SD{X} is the total difficulty of the Countable Shares embedded in block X + 1; SDi is the difficulty of
the Countable Shares miner i has contributed, and Ri∈NR is the amount of remuneration given to miner i as a
Coinbase transaction in block X + 1.
• Valid Block. A miner determines a block as a valid one when the transactions, new joins, and shares in this
block are correct, and more than 90% of the shares and new joins must be previously known to the miner.
• Support Rate. The Support rate of a block is defined as the ratio between the sum of the difficulties of the
Countable Shares for the branches stemming from this block and the sum of difficulties of all Countable Shares
of all the branches in the blockchain from the block height of this block.
SRX =
∑XL
i=X SD{i}∑k
i=0
∑iL
j=i SD{ j}
(20)
SRX is the support rate of block X; XL is the latest block on top of the blockchain branch stem from block X;
k is the number of all the branches; iL refers to the latest block on top of a specific branch; SD{X} is the total
difficulty of the Countable Shares for block X.
• Statement Rate: S TRX = S RPXRpX , where S RPX = sum(CPi∈k), k is the set of miners who have sent two valid
Shares for a block of block height X and are not violating the restriction for branch choosing (once a miner
sends two Shares for a block, it should not send Shares for another block of the same block height); RpX is the
registered power at block height X.
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5.2. Game overview
Miners need to claim an amount of calculation power they intend to put into every round of the mining game before
participating in the game, and they do so by sending a New Join to the network. A New Join is considered valid when
(1) the hash difficulty of it is equal or greater than the calculation power indicated in it; (2) The HashPrevBlock is
the hash of the preceding block of the latest block in the mainchain. Each miner is given a unique TR based on the
calculation power it claims. When a miner creates a block and finds a Nonce that fulfills Entrance Difficulty in its
TR, it broadcasts the block as well as the Nonce in a Share. Then other miners will attempt to find a Nonce in their
TR to make this block fulfill Acceptance Difficulty if they acknowledge this block as a valid one. Ideally, miners
should announce a block collectively by doing PoW in their TR in parallel. When a Share of a block is broadcast,
if the Nonce inside enables the block to reach Acceptance Difficulty, then this block is announced. The first block
reaches Acceptance Difficulty is the winner block, and miners who have contributed Shares to this block will divide
the remuneration from mining.
During the announcement, miners should send Shares that do not fulfill the acceptance difficulty but fulfill at least
25% of the power they have claimed previously as the proof of contribution. A miner can only send up to four Shares
to the network per round. If more than one block is successfully announced in one round of the game, miners should
mine on top one on a branch which has reached Acceptance Difficulty first. Miners may have different views in terms
of which block has reached Acceptance Difficulty first due to network delays. Assuming this winner block is the block
X, the blocks of the next block height (block X +1) will embed Shares of block X. According to the Shares integrated,
if a miner failed to find the Shares which together weigh more than 50% of the power it has previously claimed, this
miner will be expelled from the game. This expulsion means that the miner’s TR will be canceled since block height
is X + 1. The remuneration for the miners of block X is given in the block height X + 1 as Coinbase transactions.
All valid miners of block X divide the reward based on the difficulty of the Shares they have sent. As every miner
oversees different Try Range, it is easy to determine which miner should receive what amount of remuneration.
5.3. Game procedure
The mining game for every miner is carried out as follows:
• Register Power. A new miner creates and submits a New Join to the system.
• Get a Try Range. Miners whose New Joins are embedded into a block will be assigned with Try Ranges.
• Mining. Try to create a block and find a Nonce that fulfills Entrance Difficulty in miner’s TR. If a miner’s
block has reached Entrance Difficulty and miners have approved this block, miners will try to find a Nonce of
Acceptance Difficulty in their Try Ranges.
• Getting Reward. If a miner has submitted an adequate number of valid Shares for the winner block, the amount
of reward would be given at the next block height.
• Re-arrange Try Range and Start Over. After one round of the game, invalid miners will be globally expelled.
Miners who have failed to send Shares which stand for at least 50% of the power they have claimed will get
their Try Ranges cancelled. New miners will be added as well as Try Ranges for all the valid miners to be
re-arranged. After that, a new round of game starts. Miners who have submitted New Join before and have not
been expelled do not need to register power again to participate in the new round of the game.
5.4. Block simplification
We use a block simplification algorithm Graphene [5] to simplify a block when its size increases due to embedding
New Joins and Shares. Graphene [5] combines Bloom filter [30] and IBLT [31]. Graphene can encode dozens of
thousands of transactions into several Kbytes. Graphene encoded blocks can be decoded using previously received
information. Graphene has detailed mechanisms to deal with the failure of decoding. The structure of MWPoW block
is given in Figure 8. It is important to simplify MWPoW blocks so that increase in participants will not significantly
affect block sizes. A block of extended size can slow down block broadcasting and may, as a result, affect the fairness
of the system, i.e. some miners may receive a block faster and start to mine the next block earlier than others.
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Note that while a block is simplified, nodes still need to synchronise with all New Joins and Shares in the system
to decode simplified blocks. However, the bandwidth requirement in this case is not as heave as it seems because the
New Joins and Shares would not have been sent at the same time, but spread over many iterations. A New Join can
be a size of 102 bytes and a Share 36bytes, according to [19]. Compared to Nakamoto blockchain, MWPoW only
requires around additional 2Kbytes/s of bandwidth for a participant to synchronise all the New Joins and Shares in a
bitcoin-like system with 8000 nodes and the block interval setting of 10 minutes.
5.5. Distributed remuneration
According to the Shares embedded in a block, the compensation for announcing a preceding block is given to min-
ers in the winner group directly in Coinbase transactions. Figure 9 shows an example of a remuneration distribution,
where the sum of difficulty of the shares sent by Miner A and Miner B are 212 and 49 respectively, and the sum of the
difficulties of all valid shares of the block is 1000. The total reward amount from the last block height is 100. Miner
A and Miner B receive 21.2 coins and 4.9 coins, respectively.
Figure 8: The structure of a MWPoW block
A
Share
Difficulty
50
54
52
56 B
Share
Difficulty
10
11
12
16
Transactions
From to
System
Amount:
100 × 2121000 = 21.2 A
100 × 491000 = 4.9 B
...
Figure 9: Reward assignment
5.6. Fast block confirmation
In the Nakamoto blockchain, nodes have no information about the Support Rate of a block. Miners hold the blocks
until the difference of accumulated difficulty between different fork branches is large enough for nodes to accept the
most difficult one as the mainchain. In this case, the blocks in that branch are accepted. However, in MWPoW, by
registering power, we know the overall calculation power in the game. By counting Shares, we can acquire how
much calculation power has agreed on which branch of the blockchain and the Support Rate of a block can be easily
calculated and compared. This procedure waives the need for later block confirmations.
It is pre-defined that if a miner has sent two Shares for a block, this miner will not be allowed to change branches in
this round of the game. Otherwise, it will be expelled, and its contribution will not be counted toward the Support Rate.
It is also pre-defined that the miners should mine on the block, which, to their knowledge, first reaches Acceptance
Difficulty. A miner can move to mine on another block when this miner has not yet sent two Shares for a specific
block. A miner will likely do so if there is a block of more Support Rate.
A block is eventually accepted when:
• it is announced and is inside the highest branch of the mainchain;
• the Statement Rate of the latest block height is larger than 50%;
• the amount of power that has supported this block is significantly more than the amount of power that has
backed the second largest block plus 25% of the registered power of the latest block height.
Figure 10 shows an example of branch choosing where D stands for the difficulty, and SR stands for Support Rate.
In (a), when blocks A, B and C are announced, none of them get a more than 50% Support Rate; thus, we cannot
determine which block is to be accepted. In (b), when there are succession blocks of block A, B and C, the Support
Rates of block A, B, C are changed. Blocks C and D are eventually accepted because they have more than 50% of the
Support Rate. Meanwhile, this Support Rate is larger than the Support Rate of either block of the same block height
plus 25% of the registered power.
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Figure 10: Finally accepting a block
6. Multichain MWPoW
MWPoW provides less powerful nodes the ability to profit from mining games and to judge blocks collectively.
An accepted block can be confirmed quickly if half of the mining power has voted for it. However, because there are
New Joins and Shares, verifying a block is resource-demanding, especially when block intervals are shortened, since
the bandwidth of individual nodes needs to be high to synchronise all the data in time. Multichain MWPoW addresses
this issue and increases the scalability of the system by splitting transactions into multiple parallel MWPoWs.
6.1. Multichain MWPoW outlines
6.1.1. Definitions
• Chain ID. Chain ID is formatted as C+digits. Chain ID is given and changed based on the history of split/merge
of chains from the start of the system. A chain can only be split into two at the same time. The two new chains
use new names by appending a “0” or “1” at the end of the ID in binary format, for example, C1 split into C2
and C3. When two chains are merged, if they stem from the same branch, the ID after merging is the old name
of that branch. For example, C2 and C3 become C1 again, if they are merged. If two chains are merged into
one and they did not stem from the same branch, the name for the merged chain is the smaller one of the two
Chains’ IDs. For example, if C5 and C3 are merged, the new ID would be C3.
• Lifelength. Lifelength refers to the time (continuous iterations of mining game) that a miner can play in a chain
after being assignedto this chain. There is a pre-defined Lifelength Ti; Ti mod 4 = 0.
• New-Assign-Join. New-Assign-Join is like New Join in MWPoW but with one additional field: “Identity Key”.
To make a New-Assign-Join valid, the hash of this New-Assign-Join must fulfill T times of its Calculation
Power Claim.
• Chain Limit. Every chain has an upper limit of K and a lower limit K2 of the number of transactions and
New-Assign-Joins per block. When a pending transaction and New-Assign-Join number exceeds or breaks the
upper/lower limit, a chain will be split into two or merge with others.
• Ordinary Block. An Ordinary block (Ob) records the same information as the block in MWPoW records,
except that it does not record New Joins.
• Power-assignment Block. Apart from information of an ordinary block, Power-assignment block (Pab) addi-
tionally records New-Assign-Joins. Pab is used to assign the owners of the recorded New-Assign-Joins into
different chains. Pab records up to K New-Assign-Joins while recording up to K transactions. The preceding
block of a Pab is an Ob.
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• Assignment Box. An assignment box is the container for New-Assign-Joins, and it is embedded only in a Pab.
There are two sections in an assignment box: a New participant section and a Re-assignment section.
• New Join. New Join in Multichain MWPoW is a dataset that contains a New-assign-Join and a Merkle branch.
The Merkle branch must prove this New-Assign-Join has been written to a Pab of a particular chain.
• Fuel-up Block. Fuel-up block (Fub) of a chain records the New Joins that are assigned by a Pab to this chain
after the previous Fub of this chain. The creator of the New Joins recorded in this Fub can start a mining game
in this chain after the current block height (Try Ranges are assigned). The preceding block of a Fub is an Ob,
where this Ob’s preceding block is a Pab.
• History / OffSptring Chain. When a chain is merged/split, the new chain(s) are the Offspring chain(s) of this
chain. This chain becomes a history chain of its Offspring chain(s).
• Duty Range. A range of transactions/New-Assign-Joins, which should be processed by a chain.
• TransOnhold. TransOnhold is a number added to the block header. This number stands for the number
of transactions/New-Assign-Join received by the creator of the block. These transactions/New-Assign-Joins
should be legal and within the Duty Ranges. In the meantime, they should have not yet been written into a
block in the mainchain of this chain.
• Chainpower. The amount of the overall registered power (in PoW difficulty form) inside a chain.
• Threshold Chainpower. This ranks the CP of the participants inside a chain in ascending sequence, place
the ranked sequence in a list RCP0...NPC−1. NPC is the number of registered participants inside this chain.
Threshold Chainpower is the sum all the values from RCP0...b 23×NPC−1c
• Bl candidate. An integer array of S g items indicated in the block header,
Bl candidate(i) = RCPbi×(NPC/Sg)c, i ∈ [0, Sg) (21)
• Global Block Header. Global block header is a Merkle root of the hash of all the latest accepted blocks of all
chains.
• Crosschain Section. When one transfers a transaction between chains, the transaction is written into the Cross-
chain section.
6.1.2. Amendment to the designs of MWPoW
The following amendments have been made to the designs of MWPoW:
1. Three types of blocks: Ordinary block (Ob), Power-assignment block (Pab), and Fuel-up block (Fub) take turns
to be written into a chain, i.e. they repeat the writing sequence of Ob, Pab, Ob, Fub.
2. Fub records New Joins, where as Ob and Pab do not.
3. The Block interval time of every chain is set to be the same. Thus all chains generate blocks in an approximately
same time window.
4. TransOnHold is placed into the block header.
5. S hare is signed by the private key of the Indentity Key of its creator.
6. Chainpower is added to the block header.
7. Bl candidate is added to the block header.
8. Threshold chainpower is added to the block header.
9. Number o f participants is added to the block header, which states the number of valid registered miners inside
a chain.
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10. The block in every chain records a list of valid registered miners inside its chain. 1
11. Every block embeds a global block header; the hash of the global block header is written into the block header
of every block. Global block header records the hashes of the latest finally accepted block of all the chains. We
allow these hashes to be the second latest one because the block generation among chains goes incompletely
synchronised.
12. Nodes only hear the blocks of the chain they are assigned to as well as the block header of the announced blocks
from other chains. When a block is announced, miners in all chains should download the block header of this
block.
13. Apart from the rules of MWPoW regarding final acceptance of a block, a block reaches Acceptance Difficulty
is accepted when the chance for the block to be incorrect is lower than the required security threshold. This
chance is calculated using Equation 12. If there are two blocks which reach the Acceptance Difficulty at the
same epoch in a chain and the chance for them to be incorrect are lower than the security threshold, the one
(say Alice) with more Support Rate is accepted if the differences between the Support Rate of the two blocks is
more than a specific value. This value is defined as one that the adversary can gain with a pre-defined security
threshold probability. The chance for the adversary to control this particular value of Support Rate differences
can also be calculated using Equation 12 by enumerating some voters of Alice and assuming the enumerated
voters are controlled by the adversary (only use the enumerated votes to calculate the DG(i) and NgS (i, j)). The
enumerated adversary voters together should contribute the amount of differences between the Support Rate
of Alice and the other block. The chance for the enumerated voters to be adversary should be lower than the
security threshold probability.
Figure 11: The explanation of the additional rules for accepting a block
Figure 12 shows the structure of Multichain MWPoW.
6.1.3. Game procedure
• Register power. A participant can create a New-Assign-Join based on a Fub of a chain (HashPrevblock should
be the hash of that Fub). After the New-Assign-Join is constructed, usually after Ti iterations of the game as
the hash difficulty of this New-Assign-Join must reflect T times of its Calculation Power Claim. The participant
then sends the New-Assign-Join to that chain.
• Wait for the power assignment. In every four iterations (whenever a Pab is created), up to K qualified New-
Assign-Joins of new participants is selected by miners in a chain. A random assignment protocol is used to
place all the selected New-Assign-Joins into the assignment box of the new Pab.
• Register with the chain assigned to. After a Pab Alice, which embedded the participant’s New-Assign-Join, is
announced (reaches Acceptance Difficulty), the participant then creates a New Join, which contains that New-
Assign-Join and a Merkle branch. The Merkle branch should prove this New-Assign-Join has been assigned to
a specific chain by Alice. Finally, the participant should submit this New Join to the chain assigned by Alice.
1In the original MWPoW, the participant list is not written in the block, which can be derived by counting the New Joins and
Shares since the beginning of the system. Including participant list does not increase the bandwidth demand significantly because
the block is encoded using Graphene. Nodes do not need to swap any clear text of the participant list unless a discrepancy is
detected.
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Figure 12: The Block of Multichain MWPoW
• Get a Try Range. Miners in the assigned chain check if the New Join they have received is valid. They also
check if the Pab (Alice), which has made the assignment, is the latest finally accepted Pab in its chain. A Try
Range is given to the participant at the next Fub, then the original rules of MWPoW begin to apply.
• Split and merge the chains. When the chain violates chain limits, the latest block will indicate if the chain
should be split or merged. The miner then enters the split or merged chain following the rule of split/merge.
• Reassignment. When a miner has inside a chain for Ti rounds of the game, it is reassigned to another chain.
• Expel. The same rule as MWPoW, if a miner has not sent at least three valid Shares per iteration that are
successfully embedded in the block, it is expelled.
Figure 13 shows an example of the game procedure of Multichain MWPoW.
6.2. Global parameters
6.2.1. Group boundary
The number of nodes in a system can be derived by adding together the number of participants indicated in the
block headers of the latest finally accepted blocks in every chain. Let NC be the number of chains,
bl(i) = min(Bl candidate(i, j)), i ∈ [0, Sg), j ∈ [0, NC) (22)
where Bl candidate(i, j) refers to the Bl candidate(i) of the latest finally accepted block in chain j. Miners of chain
j then classify the nodes inside the chain according to the bl derived. Every time the group boundary is determined,
miners should examine if some restrictions are met. The restrictions includes:
1. 2 × Threshold Chainpower ≥ Chainpower.
2. There is at least one node from every group in this chain.
3. Max(Pr( j)) ≤ Threshold, where Threshold is the predefined security threshold.
If these restrictions are not met, then chain j should be merged with others.
6.2.2. Global block header and dispute resolution
Because nodes only synchronise information with its chain and the block headers of the announced blocks of other
chains, nodes are unable to determine if a block of another chain is genuine and can be finally accepted. To solve this,
we propose a mechanism:
1. When a block is announced or finally accepted, relevant miners should broadcast this information to miners of
other chains.
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Figure 13: The procedure of Multichain MWPoW
2. Miners should periodically ask several miners in other chains to see if the announced blocks have been finally
accepted.
3. If a conflict is known to a node, this node should synchronise with the participant list in the last block before
the suspicious one. It should then determine the genuine Shares and calculate the support rate of the blocks.
4. A block carried a wrong finally accepted block hash in its global block header should be rejected. The miner
should not mine on this block in any circumstances.
Because the calculation power is distributed in chains, it is easier for Byzantines to over-write specific blocks in
a chain using a greater calculation power. To prevent unregistered nodes affecting the generation of blocks, we rule
that:
1. The Shares sent to the network should be signed by the Identity Keys which have been claimed in the New-
Assign-Joins;
2. The Nonces should be within the Try Range that is associated with the Identity Keys.
Under this mechanism, the first block of a fraud chain of blocks can be determined as invalid because Byzantine
cannot provide the correct Shares which are signed by previous participants.
When a new block of a chain which fulfills the Entrance difficulty comes out, nodes of that chain should check the
global block header of that block before contributing Shares for it. In this way, when a block is announced, at least a
certain amount of calculation power agrees with the global block header attached. Because nodes synchronise all the
block headers of the announced blocks of all the chains, they can see the differences between the Merkle root of all
the global block headers. A node will request and verify the relevant global block headers if it cannot construct the
same Merkle root of the global block header. Figure 14 is an example of a global block header, where NC is the Chain
ID, and LASH is the hash of the latest finally accepted the block.
In a brief summary, if a Byzantine attempts to change a finally accepted block of a chain, it must place enough
power inside this chain through the normal procedure. If the power is not registered before, it cannot generate valid
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NC LHASH
C2 EA232341AEAFEWER2EKWFL23EWRKL
C6 FB1113A122FIAQFXWSLEEF23ERK1LR4
C7 CCA313A152FIAQF1AWLEWAE3WFETQ
Figure 14: Global block header
Shares, nodes inside the chain will not recognise an invalid block which has reached the Acceptance Difficulty. When
nodes of other chains ask which block has been finally accepted, or the honest miners inside a chain has received a
fraud block of that chain from the network, the registered honest power inside that chain will appoint another block to
the network. When a conflict of finally accepted block has occurred, the Byzantine’s block cannot pass the verification
of other chains.
6.2.3. Duty Range, Chain split and merge
Duty ranges for a chain include all the New-Assign-Joins, transactions, and New Joins which:
• The HashPrevBlock of the New-Assign-Joins is a block inside this chain.
• The HashPrevBlock of the New-Assign-Joins indicates a block in the history chain of the current chain. The
hash of this New-Assign-Join is within a specific range.
• All the Input transactions of the transactions have been committed to any block of this chain.
• All the Input transactions of the transactions have been embedded in the history chains of the current chain. The
hash of these Input transactions is within a specific range.
• The New Joins which have indicated their creators are assigned to this chain.
• The New Joins, which have indicated their creators, are assigned to the history chains of this chain, and the hash
of the New Joins are within a range.
The valid New-Assign-Joins, transactions and New Joins of a chain complies with the following:
• They are under the government of this chain (inside the Duty Range).
• The INPUT transactions are not used before.
When TransOnhold indicated in the latest finally accepted block of a chain is more substantial than 2 × K, then this
block is split into two due to the next block’s height. However, a chain cannot be split when either of the split chains
will not meet the chain restrictions stated in section 6.2.1. When a chain C1 is split:
• Duty Ranges. According to the hash of the transactions written in the blocks of chain C1, if the hashes of the
transactions are within the range of 0 to 2255 then these transactions are governed by chain C2. Otherwise, the
transactions are governed by chain C3. The duty ranges inherited from chain C1 are also equally split into two.
Chain C2 will take the duty ranges of C1 with lower half hashes while the chain C3 will take the upper half.
The rule also applies to the New Joins on hold. If the hashes of which are within 2255, then the New Joins are
processed by C2. Otherwise, they are processed by C3.
• Participants. Rank all the participants by the amount of their Calculation Power Claim in ascending order, a
participant is relocated to C2 if Pindex mod 2 =: 0 where Pindex is the index number of this participant inside
the ranked participant sequence, otherwise this participant is relocated to C3.
Figure 15 shows an example of the chain split and merge, where the system starts from one chain C1, orange
squares are blocks in the chains that currently exist while gray squares are the blocks in history chains.
When merging, a chain will be merged with another that is closest to it in Chain ID. If there are two chain
candidates, select the one with a smaller Chain ID. The duty ranges of the chains are also merged. Assume chain
C5 is merged into another chain C3 after a block Alice in C5 is announced. When Alice is announced, the miners
21
C1C1C1
Blocks
in
chain C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C2C2C2 C4C4C4
C5C5C5 C2
C3 Duty Ranges:
C1 : [2254 + 1, 2255]
C3 : [0, 2255]
C2 Duty Ranges:
C1 : [0, 2254]
C2 : [0, 2255]
C4 : [0, 2255]
C5 : [0, 2255]
Figure 15: Chains overview
in C3 are aware of this merging because they synchronise the block header of all the announced blocks. The miners
in C3 then synchronise the data in C5 between the block interval of the last finally accepted block of C5 and Alice.
The miners use this data to verify Alice. If they believe C5 should be merged with C3 according to the rules, they
will mine on the merged chain. When a safe number of nodes in both C3 and C5 has approved this merge through
mining in the merged branch, then the merge is completed. This safe number can be calculated using Equation 12.
When chain C5 has not generated a finally accepted block for five continuous block interval, the chains into which
the chain C5 is possible to merge should synchronise the data from C5 and determine if they should merge with C5.
The merged chain starts at the next block height of the highest block height in its history chains. When a chain C3
seeking to merge to C5, C5 is also seeking to merge; if C5 is trying to merge with another chain C6, then three or
more chains merge into one at the same time. Figure 16 shows an example of the chain merge and split, where gray
squares are abandoned blocks. If a sufficient number of nodes in C3 and C5 agree on merging in block height 14, then
other branches of them are abandoned.
6.3. Crosschain operation
Because every chain can confirm the situation of blocks in other chains (has been / not yet finally accepted), we
take advantage of that to conduct crosschain operations. When a user wants to transfer a transaction to another chain,
it first sends the cross-chain-request to the chain that governs the transaction (Origin chain). If this cross-chain-request
is written into the crosschain section of a finally accepted block afterward, the user then sends a cross-chain-confirm
to the transfer destination chain. The cross-chain-confirm is a Merkle branch that can prove the cross-chain-request
has been written into the crosschain section. The destination chain should write the cross-chain-confirm into its
cross-chain section, and then the transaction is transferred. The difference in block height between the cross-chain-
request and the cross-chain-confirm embedded the blocks should be less than three. If the cross-chain-confirm cannot
be written into the destination chain in time, the user will ask the origin chain to cancel the cross-chain request.
The miners in the original chain will acquire the cross-chain section of relevant blocks of that destination chain and
determine if the transfer should be cancelled. If the user does not send the cancel request, the transaction is being
transferred to the destination chain. Figure 17 shows an overview of the cross-chain operation. New transactions of
the destination chain can refer to the cross-chain-confirms written in the cross-section of this destination chain as the
INPUT transactions.
6.4. Power assignment block
In this section, we show the procedures of forming a Pab for a chain C5. There are two parts in forming a Pab:
Periodical power re-assignment and New power adding. The structure of the Assignment Box and New-Assign-Join
is shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19 respectively.
6.4.1. Periodical power reassignment
Select the nodes which were added to C5 at the block height BH−Ti, where BH is the current block height. Place
the selected nodes’ New-Assign-Join into a list PSL by ascending order of calculation power claim indicated in their
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New-Assign-Joins. Create a new sequence RPS L,
RPS Li = Hash(MGBH ⊕ Hash(PS Li)) (23)
where MGBH is the Merkle root of the global block header indicated in the latest block of C5. Link PS Li with
RPS Li and rank RNAJ by alphabetical order. After that, a new index of PS L can be reached. Let NC be the number
of sub-sections in the “Re-assignment section” of the Assignment box. Acs(i) represents sub-section i ,
Acs(i) =
⋃
(hash(PS L j)+ j) mod NC=i
PS L j (24)
Nodes in Acs(i) are assigned to chain i. If chain i becomes a history chain right after, nodes in Acs(i) are assigned to
its OffSpring chains according to the Duty Range.
6.4.2. Adding New Power
Miners in C5 take the New-Assign-Joins from all unassigned New-Assign-Joins received, which fulfill the follow-
ing criteria:
• The Nonce inside can make the hash of this New-Assign-Join fulfill the Intended difficulty.
• The HashPrevBlock is the hash of the Fub at Ti iterations before the current block height.
After selecting the New-Assign-Joins, the following procedure is carried out:
1. Let InD be the Intended Difficulty indicated in a New-Assign-Join. If bl(i + 1) > InD >= bl(i) then place this
New-Assign-Join to list i. bl(S g) = +∞.
2. Rank the New-Assign-Joins in every list i by ascending order of abs(InD− tt), where tt = bl(i+1)+bl(i)2 . Specially,
in this step, bl(Sg) = bl(Sg − 1).
3. Select K/Sg New-Assign-Joins from the top of every list. If a list has less than K/Sg New-Assign-Joins, then
take all of them.
4. Rank the selected in descending order of their calculation power claim, and sum the front 13 . If that is larger
than half of the overall power of the selected New-Assign-Joins, then delete the New-Assign-Joins from the top
until the front 13 of power claims are not more than half of the overall power of the selected New-Assign-Joins.
5. Rank the remaining New-Assign-Joins according to the alphabetical order of their hashes and place them into a
list NAJ. Create a new sequence RNAJ,
RNAJi = Hash(MGBH ⊕ Hash(NAJi)) (25)
Link NAJi with RNAJi and rank RNAJ by alphabetical order. After that, a new index of NAJ can be reached.
6. Let the “New participant section” in the assignment box assign New-Assign-Joins to min(NC, K) chains. NAJi mod min(NC,K)= j
is assigned to chain j indicated in the assignment box, NC is the number of chains.
7. Write the assignment plan into the “New participant section” in the assignment box.
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Figure 18: Assignment box
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6.4.3. Determine the exact assignment
Any chain accepts the New-Assign-Joins which assigned to it if these New-Assign-Joins are written in a “Re-
assignment section”. If a New-Assign-Join Alice claims she has been assigned to a chain Ben by a Pub Gary of C5 in
“New participant section”, Ben verifies this information by the following steps:
1. Let Ll be the number of subsections in the “New participant section” of the Assignment box of Gary, and NC
be the number of chains. Rank chains by the alphabetical order of their Chain ID.
2. The New-Assign-Joins in subsection i, i ∈ [0, Ll) of the Assignment box of Gary is assigned to chain
Hash(Gary) hash(MGBH + i) mod NC in the ranked sequence.
If it is verified by the above procedure that Alice is assigned to Ben, then Ben should accept Alice.
6.5. Fuel-up block
Miners need to send a New Join to the chain which they have been assigned to. The New Joins are embedded in
the Fuel-up block, and Try Ranges are assigned afterward. Figure 20 is the structure of New Join. The New join for
any chain Ben is valid when:
1. The Merkle Branch and the hash of the New-Assign-Join attached can form the Merkle root of the Assignment
Box of the chain who has made the assignment.
2. The New-Assign-Join is assigned to Ben.
3. The Pab which made this assignment is the latest finally accepted Pab of that chain.
4. This New Join has not been used previously.
New Join
The Chain ID of the chain which made the
assignment.
Assignment
Chain ID
The block header hash of the block which
made the assignment.
Block header
hash
Merkle branch The Merkle Root of the Assignment Box.
L
R
L
L R
R
multiple levels
...
...
The hash
Ll New-Assign-Join
Intended
DifficultyNew-Assign-Join
Figure 20: New Join
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6.5.1. Power adjustment
When a New Join is valid, it is recorded into a Fub of chain Ben. The miners of chain Ben acquire the In-
tended Difficulty of the New Joins and add the nodes into the chain. However, after adding, if the restriction
2 × Threshold Chainpower >= Chainpower is not met, the Intended Difficulty of the new assigned nodes in
group(S g − 1) is lowered to bl(S g − 1). If the restriction has still not been met, the chain will be merged with
others. The adjusted Intended Difficulty is then used as the reference for assigning a Try Range.
7. Security analysis
In this section we consider the security features of the proposed Multichain MWPoW in terms of blockchain
hypothesis challenges.
Random distribution.
The randomness of the assignment is safeguarded by MGBH in every step. MGBH is changed by every operation
and by every transaction embedded in the blocks at the time. An attacker cannot control everything that happens in a
system and as a result, making MGBH impossible to be pre-calculated. Also, Bl is hard to be predicted because nodes
can join and leave the system freely at any time. A node added or dropped causes a shift in Bl. It is also impossible
to predict when the New-Assign-Joins that fulfill the selection criteria would appear on the internet because that is
up to the participants globally. For the above result, attackers cannot control the rank of New-Assign-Joins in the
sequences, making it impossible to pre-calculate which chains their New-Assign-Joins will be assigned. Also, as it
requires Ti times of calculation power claim to qualify a new miner, there will be no gain to quit a chain and repeat
the assignment procedure. It takes the same effort to get the miners reassigned to other chains regardless whethr it is
a chain or out of a chain currently.
Determine block legibility of other chains.
The protocol discussed in Section 6.2.2 provides a “detect” and “verify” then “synchronise” procedure. When a
block is announced, its block header flows to the whole network. When a conflict is detected, miners of other chains
can distinguish and recognise a genuine block by acquiring Shares during the conflict and the participant list before the
conflict. The recognition is written in the block header as the global block header, which is synchronized and verified
by miners globally. We secure the gateway to the inside of every block by the random assignment. Meanwhile, the
blocks created by the power outside a chain are not recognised globally, this secures (2) and (3) of the blockchain
hypothesis Challenges.
The number of honest participants and the proportion of honest power.
We use the indicator Threshold chainpower to describe if the power distribution inside a chain is balanced and
secured. If the number of participants in a chain cannot guarantee a safe result, we will merge this chain to others.
Categorisations.
We use the property of a ranked sequence to make the nodes into different categorisations. Nodes can use different
powers to make a rough selection of the group, but it is up to the situation of the contemporary nodes to determine
the groups eventually. The queues are automatically divided into equal length, few operations to maintain the system
is needed, not like previous n/2 approaches requiring strict restrictions. The design not only satisfies the challenge of
the n/2 blockchain sharding hypothesis, but also brings flexibility and stability.
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Table 4: The minimum size of structures in Multichain MWPoW
Name Size Description
Block header 124 + Three 256-bits hashes: the hash of the preceding block,MGBH, and the Markle root of the transactions.
Sg× 4 bytes Seven 32-bits integers: Chainpower,TransOnhold, Threshold Chainpower, Number of participants,
Timestamp,Entrance Difficulty,Accetpance Difficulty. Sg number of integers: Bi candidate.
Share 64.5 bytes A 4-bits integer(the last four bits of the block hash),a 256-bits integer (Nonce),and a 256-bits signature.
New-Assign-Join 132 bytes A 256-bits hash (HashPrevBlock), a 32-bits integer (Intended Difficulty), three 256-bits integers
(Wallet address, Identity Key and Nonce).
New Join 12+32+log2(K)× Three 32-bits integers ( Ll,Intended Difficulty and Assignment Chain ID). A 256-bits hash
32 bytes (Block header hash), and log2(K) number of 256-bits hashes (Merkle branch).
8. Data analysis
Miners are required to synchronise block headers of the announced blocks of all the chains and the blocks inside
the chains they have been assigned to. Table 4 shows the minimum size of a block header, Share, New Join, or
New-Assign-Join in Multichain MWPoW.
The participants send shares during every iteration after joining in a chain. The majority of New-Assign-Joins are
only broadcast at block heights before a Pab in one iteration interval. The New Joins are broadcast between a Pab is
finally accepted, and before the next Fub comes out (also one mining interval). Thus, the minimum upload bandwidth
required for a miner in the most data-intensive iteration is Max(S izeNew Join, S izeS hare × 4, S izeNew−Assign−Join). The
download bandwidth for a participant in the most data-intensive iteration in a system with NPC participants inside
the chain is NPC ∗ Max(S izeNew Join, S izeS hare × 4, S izeNew−Assign−Join) + S izeTransactions × K. Figure 21 shows the
download bandwidth requirement and transaction throughput globally with n = 8000 and different number of NC and
K. NC is ranged from 1 to 400 ( n20 , 20 participants per chain). Sg = 20, NPC =
n
NC , while K ranged from 2 to 1000.
Figure 21: Data requirement and Throughput per iteration with different K and n when N = 8000.
9. Experiment
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the overall performance of Multichain MWPoW and test its scalability.
We compare its performance with RapidChain [16] and n/2 Byzantine node resistant blockchain sharding approaches
[28, 29] regarding throughput and transaction confirmation time with different percentage of adversary power in
the system. In this experiment, we maintain a 10−6 failure chance for every approach. We use a regulated layout
of Distributed Ledger Network [32] as the communication protocol used for the essential P2P connections. The
connections and the network structure are dynamically adjusted to fit into the data flow to make data propagation fast.
9.1. Experiment setup
We simulated 8000 nodes in a network with 10Mbytes/s bandwidth per node in our experiments. For Multichain
MWPoW, we gave every connection a random delay time ranging from 1ms to 200ms. The distribution of connection
delay time is shown in Figure 22. We have simulated three scenarios A, B, and C of calculation power for every
26
node, which are shown in Figure 23. In our experiments, we set K to be 2000, meaning that blocks can contain up
to 2000 transactions per block, and a Pab can contain up to 2000 New-Assign-Joins in the New participant section of
the assignment box. When blocks are broadcast inside a chain, the blocks will be encoded by Graphene [5] like the
original MWPoW. If a block is requested by nodes outside the chain or is requested by a new participant when it is
synchnising data, the block sent will be the one which is decoded using Graphene.
Figure 22: Delay time distribution
Figure 23: Power distribution
For Other approaches, i.e. the RapidChain and the two existing n/2 blockchain sharding approaches, they are
implemented exactly the same as the network setting described above for Multichain MWPoW, except that the protocol
runs on every node is not Multichain MWPoW, but the respective protocal and every node is equal in voting.
We send 106 transactions per iteration to the network by random nodes (equal allocation). The size of each
transaction is fixed at 500bytes. We record the number of chains (shards) in the system and the throughput (the
number of transactions processed globally per iteration). We also record the transaction confirmation time and the
frequency of data refreshing (the frequency of a node being re-assigned). For Multichain MWPoW, we increase the
amount of malignant power from 0 to 50% of the overall power during an attack, the number of malignant nodes may
be higher than half of the node population. For other approaches, we increase the number of malignant nodes from 0
to 50% of all the nodes during an attack. We set the block interval to be 10 seconds globally; the experiments were
conducted over 1000 block intervals. Ti is set to 20 block intervals and Sg = 20. For n/2 blockchain sharding and
flexible n/2 blockchain sharding, m is set to be 33 at the beginning, and T = 0.7 × m. The flexible n/2 blockchain
sharding approach may adjust this number during the experiment. The number of shards is set as 55 for RapidChain
to maintain the security threshold. For RapidChain, 20% of the transactions are multiple input Shard transactions:
a transaction that must be confirmed by all the input shards to proceed. All the approaches used in our experiments
maintain a 10−6 failure probability.
An adversary node in Multichain MWPoW will function as an honest node if it does not have enough companions
in the chain. When there are enough adversary nodes inside a blockchain to halt the shards, the adversary nodes will
function maliciously by attempting to create corrupted fork branches. The adversary node in RapidChain has a 50%
chance to drop out in every ten iterations. The dropped node will apply to join the RapidChain again immediately.
The adversary nodes will start to create wrong blocks when they have gained control over the shard. The adversary
nodes for the two n/2 blockchain sharding approaches will correctly function when they do not have enough nodes
to halt the shards. They will halt a shard immediately when having enough number of adversary companion. We set
a transaction in the first block as the initial transaction. The inputs of transactions are randomly selected from the
transactions in previous blocks. In our experiments, Multichain MWPoW started with one chain named C1. Nodes
were added to the system following the rule of Multichain MWPoW as soon as possible. Nodes in other approaches
were also added following the rules as quickly as possible. When increasing the adversary percentage, we randomly
select the honest nodes in the system and turn them into adversary nodes to obtain the required percentage.
9.2. Experiment results
The experiment lasted 1000 block intervals. Figure 24 shows the changes of the chain (shards) in the progress of
block interval. As can be seen from the results, for Multichain MWPoW, the number of chains and the processing
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capacity are dynamically adjusted to fit the data flow and to prevent adversary’s power from halting the chains. C
power distribution scenario is generally more steady than A and B, mostly because the power is more balanced.
From 25, we can see that the n/2 sharding approach stops functioning after an adversary took 33% of the nodes,
although still produced correct result. We stopped RapidChain functioning after an adversary took 33% of the power
because at that point the security of RapidChain was wholly broken. The flexible n/2 approach also uses K to
indicate pending transactions. We can see that transactions processed by the flexible n/2 approach is drastic, and
this is different from the pattern in Figure 24. This indicates what number of processed transactions could be. We
see this difference because when a shard halts in both n/2 and flexible n/2 approaches, the shard is frozen until new
memberships replace the old nodes in this shard. The halting problem also explains why the n/2 approach has slight
fluctuation in operation. When a global halting occurred, the transaction per second was reduced to zero, and the
system took a few intervals to recover from halting.
In Multichain MWPoW, however, the system would not stop processing transactions; the halting is only about
when the blocks would be finally confirmed. Figure 28 shows the times of data refreshing in our experiment. Recall
from experiment setup, there is 120 chance for the adversary nodes in RapidChain to quit and rejoin a shard immedi-
ately. Since when some nodes are assigned to a shard at any time, the same number of old nodes in this shard must
be reassigned to other shards. This design causes the majority of refreshing in RapidChain. There is no limitation
of how many times a node can join or leave the system so that an attacker can make this attack in reality on a large
scale. This attack could also work for both n/2 and flexible n/2. However, in our experiment, the adjustment for the
n/2 approaches are used mainly to solve the halting problem. For Multichain MWPoW, the adjustments are primarily
there for solving the local halting and for adjusting to data flow (changes in the number of pending transactions).
Figure 24: The number of chains/ shards.
Figure 25: The number of transactions processed per
iteration.
Figure 26 shows the average number of transactions per iteration in our experiments. This came to 0 for the n/2
blockchain sharding approach and RapidChain after the adversary has taken 33% of the nodes. Figure 27 shows the
average pending time for nodes to accept a transaction finally.
Figure 26: The number of transaction per itera-
tion.
Figure 27: Transaction confirmation time.
Recorded from the time a transaction is embed-
ded to a block, and this block is finally accepted.
Figure 28: Data refreshing times.
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10. Conclusion
We have presented the Multichain MWPoW approach to blockchain sharding in this paper. Our new solution
achieves an efficient and robust decentralised autonomous organisation architecture. Multichain MWPoW is the first
blockchain sharding approach that can withstand up to 50% of adversary power without assuming that honest people
have to create as many nodes in the system as possible. Our experiments show that Multichain MWPoW largely
outperforms Rapidchain, the n/2 blockchain sharding approach [28] as well as the flexible n/2 blockchain sharding
approach [29] in terms of stability, throughput and transaction confirmation time. We have proposed a secure random
distribution mechanism and maintained a threshold distribution of power inside every chain. We categorise nodes into
different classes dynamically and require at least one node per class per chain, the number of participants per chain
(shard) is significantly reduced, allowing more chains to be be split. This brings a significant improvement in terms
of scalability.
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